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By AG MRA Date 12/10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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June 29, 1972

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To: The Acting Secretary

From: J - Ambassador Johnson

DPRC Meeting - June 27, 1972Defense Five-year Program & Resources availability

The DPRC meeting yesterday considered a study of US strategy and strategic force posture. At the outset of the meeting Henry Kissinger noted that the study was somewhat out of date, but said that the purpose of this meeting was to furnish guidance to the working group for a redraft of the study. For example, he noted that some of the defensive options in the study had been made obsolete by the recent SALT agreements, and that the fourth sufficiency criterion (light defense) presumably was no longer applicable (except for a possible attack on Washington) and should be revised.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether there was general agreement on the objectives for strategic forces (see Tab A). Henry's staff stated that there was general agreement in the working group on the first five objectives. While this was subsequently challenged, I raised a question concerning the meaning of objective number six which calls for the capability to enforce relatively favorable war outcomes. After an inept attempt by JCS representatives to justify this objective, Henry asked that the JCS should prepare a paper describing the strategic concept and the force capabilities required to attain such an objective. Jim Schlesinger suggested that the primary requirement in light of SALT was additional civil defense capabilities, and suggested this would not be very costly.


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There followed a discussion of various aspects of the first five strategic forces objectives, in particular relating to what kinds of strategic forces were required to maintain a credible deterrent with respect to our allies. Mr. Weiss pointed out that this had been extensively studied and that sharp disagreements remained between the agencies. Some believed that as a result of the large and rapid growth in Soviet strategic capabilities, a US strategy based upon destroying massive numbers of Soviet population (i.e., the Assured Destruction concept), in response to an attack on our allies, was increasingly less credible. Solutions might be found in altered US strategic concepts and/or force capabilities. Others believed that maximum deterrence continued to reside in reliance on Assured Destruction. Some believed that US strategic forces could not be used to protect allies and advocated a deliberate de-coupling of our strategic forces from Europe. Admiral Lee expressed ACDA views that we were dealing with a fundamentally changed strategic situation in which it was inevitable that our deterrent would be less credible and there was nothing we could do about it. Kissinger asked that the study group examine how our strategic forces can contribute to the first three strategic objectives particularly with respect to allies. Gardiner Tucker noted that it was inappropriate to consider only strategic nuclear forces and the tactical nuclear forces also need to be considered in this connection.

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Dr. Kissinger noted that there was a risk of our being paralyzed in a crisis because of the lack of plans short of an all-out SIOP response. He noted that we cannot continue to rely upon the Soviets backing down in future crises confrontations as they have in the past and there was therefore a need for thinking through what options could be made available to the President and what their force implications were. He posed the following questions: How do you most effectively deter nuclear war? Failing that, how do you limit nuclear war? What do you attack? Do we have the forces that are needed to accomplish limited strategic strikes? Jim Schlesinger

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noted that the Soviet Union had 65% of their payload in 318 SS-9 missiles. He suggested the need for a hard target kill capability to attack this vulnerable element of the Soviet forces; suggesting this would make the Soviets more cautious. Admiral Lee noted that the Administration was on record against development of such a capability. Schlesinger replied that we need a hard target kill capability if we are going to take sub-SIOP options seriously.

Dr. Kissinger referred to the general strategic options (Tab B) and said that he did not see much difference between them. Schlesinger said that there was a considerable difference in cost between option 2 and option 3 because option 3 involved expensive command and control capabilities. Kissinger urged that for each option a specific set of forces be developed and that each be related to a strategic concept. I concurred in the need to translate concepts into specific forces.

I suggested that we also needed to consider growing Chinese capabilities if we are going to look a decade ahead. Henry agreed noting we should not write off our superiority against China too readily, but also acknowledged that the absence of urban ABM defense removed certain options. He suggested that the study group examine the need for a counterforce capability against China.

Kissinger summed up by instructing the working group to prepare a revision of the study including considerations of the points discussed at this meeting. He urged that a new paper avoid abstract discussions and illustrate each option with force requirements. He also urged that differences of view be brought out sharply in the paper, and that a new study be completed this summer in time for the DPRC's consideration of the FY 74 budget.


Attachments:

Tab A - Objectives for US Strategic Forces

Tab B - General Strategic Options

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SECRETTAB AOBJECTIVES FOR US STRATEGIC FORCES


1. Deter strategic nuclear attacks against United States and its allies.
2. Prevent coercion of the United States and its allies with threats from nuclear powers.
3. Contribute to the deterrence of tactical nuclear and conventional attack on vital US security interests.
4. Maintain strategic stability with the Soviet Union, both in terms of discouraging a first strike during a crisis and in minimizing the incentives for the arms race.
5. If deterrence fails, limit damage to the United States and its allies to the extent possible. Moreover, support termination of nuclear warfare as quickly as possible, prior to the onset of widespread devastation, on terms that are not unfavorable to the US.

Disagreement existed in the interagency study group about adding the following objective:

-- Maintain the obvious capability to ensure that the United States would emerge in a position of relative advantage from any level of strategic nuclear warfare.

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SECRETTAB BGENERAL STRATEGIC OPTIONS

- I. A well-hedged urban industrial (U/I) retaliatory capability. This alternative would provide a high confidence second-strike capability against Soviet and Chinese cities and industry.
- II. Alternative I plus planning and organization changes to provide greater flexibility for employment of US strategic nuclear forces than currently exists.
- III. Alternative II plus improvements in command and control hardware, or missile counterforce capability, or both, to provide even greater flexible response capability.
- IV. Improvements in the numbers and qualities of strategic forces designed to achieve outcomes favorable to the United States in any nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union.

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